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Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. 
The Ca.fnference sought the views of the SG, who 
takes something of a wishy-washy position, The 
position seems to be that the company is relying somehow 
on the practice of the United States government not 
to hire aliens, a practice which may be affected by 
this Court's decision in Sugarman, Presumably, the 
argument continues, if the United States abandons 
this practice, the company may abandon it, thereby 
obviating the need to pass on the question whether 
the statute authorizes the EEOC guideline, My 
recommendation is that you hold this case for 
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6~ ¢ r/1 1. Petr was refused employment by resp because she 
I~~ Q'"\) . 1/ 
0 ~~ ~ is not a United States citize~. She brought a civil 
ef /,,J\)j'\ S~ action after complaining to the Equgl Opportunity 
n} ')ItS ~V (.J7 Commission and receiving a "Notice of Right to Sue. •• 
f i~~ J\ The USDC W.D. Texas (Suttle) upheld her claim under 
Q/.~ ~()f.- ,., 
~~ ~- v 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a)(l), finding that discrimination 
v . )t t-> 
c~v ~((]· ~ 
\_...._. ~(t;c:; prohibition on discrimination on the asis of "national 
OP Et \' o,J. tt-\'v ~ \f\ i ...-S [>. rJ ,!)("'('\ (.1 \{ . L,~l O ~ f(-( QJ / . ~ r\"( . 
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on the basis of citizenship was encompassed within the 
- 2 -
ori,& in." CA 5 reversed. Petr claims that discrimination 
against legally resident aliens is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a). 
2. a. Factss Petr was denied employment by resp under 
a long-standing policy that only United States citizens 
would be hired. Resp, all agree, does not discriminate -against anyone on the basis of national origin. Petr is 
~ twa£,_, 
of Mexican origin, and 92% of resp's total employees are 
Mexican origin. Resp's policy against hiring noncitizens 
is not related to any work requiring government security 
clearances. Petr is a lawfully resident alien, married to a 
citizen. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer --
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual ••• because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; :-.. -
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (a). The EEOC has promulgated a regulation 
providings 
Because discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship has the effect of discriminating 
on the basis of national origin, a lawfully 
immigrated alien who is domiciled or residing 
in the country may not be discriminated against 
on the basis of his citizenship, except ••• 
[when a statute or Executive order establishes 
requirements in the interests of natiQnal security]. 
29 C.F.R. §l606.1(d) as quoted in petn at 2. 
b. Court below: CA 5 accepted the finding of the 
dist ct that there was "no discrimination on the basis of 
------- ---- ~----------------------
ancestry or ethnic . backgz:.aund" in the employment practices of -




plain (speaking of "national origin" and not "citizenship") -
that no resort to legislative history was required, but 
the court looked at history anyway. It found no evidence 
that Congress intended to protect non-citizens. CA 5 
felt the EEOC regulation could not be used to show intent . here, 
even though this Court had used an EEOC regulation to show 
intent in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 u.s. 424, 434 (1971). 
CA 5 noted that no constitutional attack was made; the court . 
added that the absence of state action would make a Fourteenth 
Amendment attack ineffective in any event. 
3. a. Petr's contentionsz Petr argues that theCA 5 
interpretation is unduly narrow because discrimination 
on the basis of citizenship is the type of discrimination 
that Title VII was intended to prevent. Petr argues the 
CA 5 opinion will undermine the objectives of the statute 
by depriving aliens who most need help the opportunity to 
work while allowing immigrants who are established to claim 
protection. Petr stresses that the CA 5 interpretation rejects 
the official EEOC position. 
Petr claims that this is "national origin plus" 
discrimination. The Court rejected "sex plus" (women with 
pre-school children) discrimination in Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 400 u.s. 542 (1971). Petr argues this 
variation on the theme should not be allowed. 
Petr cites Graham v. Richardson, 403 u.s. 365, 372 
(1971, per Justice Blackmun, Justice Harlan concurring in 
part) for the proposition that classifications based on 
i ·"' 
- 4 -
alienage are suspect under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although petr recognizes that Equal Protection cases have 
no immediate bearing on a statutory issue, petr seeks to 
invoke the spirit of the "suspect classification" doctrine 
as an aid to statutory construction. __________________ ,___________ _ 
Finally, petr suggests that the CA 5 interpretation 
conflicts with congressional policy, expressed in the immigration 
laws, that employment of aliens should be encouraged. 
b. Resp's argument: Resp reiterates that petr was 
not discriminated against because of her Mexican origin or 
her Spanish surname. Some 98.5% of the individuals employed 
in the position sought by Espinoza were of Mexican origin. 
Resp interprets the EEOC guideline as an overbroad attempt 
to prohibit the use of discrimination against noncitizens as 
a subterfuge for discrimination against certain nationalities. 
Resp agrees with that objective but argues it has nothing 
to do with this case. 
Resp contends that Phillips v. Martin ~·1arietta 
Corp. dealt with refusal to hire women with pre-school 
children even though men with pre-school children were 
hired. There all people with pre-school children were 
not treated equally. Here resp argues that discrimination 
is on the basis of citizenship alone; national origin is 
not relevant. 
Resp argues the CA 5 decision is consistent with 
Civil Service regulations that allow only citizens to take 
competitive examinations, even though discrimination on the 
basis of national origin is prohibited in Civil Service. 
Resp argues that the "suspect classification" 





Fourteenth Amendment to engage in broad construction. 
Resp contends the Court has recognized in Graham a 
difference between "alienage" (citizenship) and "nationality," 
and this difference cannot be ignored when Congress prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of one of these characteristics 
but not on the basis of the other. 
4. Discussion: This issue is important and difficult. 
This case would be a good vehicle because the facts are 
undisputed and the employer does not appear to be using 
citizenship discrimination as a substitute for nationality 
discrimination. Any expansion of 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 will 
have far-reaching effects, and the Court might wish to 
r- -
allow more lower courts to consider the issue before this 
Court examines the problem. Numerous federal agencies will 
be affected if cert is granted, and the views of the Solicitor -------- ,...., _ __..~:-:;--:-;;-.;----:-:: General mignt be helpful a!:some stage in the decision-making 
process. 
There is a response. 
12/12/72 Miller Op CA in petn appx 
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No. 72-671 Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 
Summer Memorandum 
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having read most of 
the briefs. It is entirely preliminary and, in large degree superficial. 
Further study is indicated. 
Statement of Case 
This case involves Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, making 
it unlawful for an employer: 
"To fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . 
because of such individual's national ori in". 42 U.S.C. §2000 (e)-
2 (a)(l). 
Petitioner, a lawfully admitted resident alien (Mexican) living in San Antonio 
was refused employment by Farah Manufacturing Company solely because she 
was not a U.S. citizen. The EEOC Regional Director found, and it is conceded, 
that Petitioner was not denied employment because she is S anish or Mexican . 
.__ - --- ~
The district judge found that "persons of Mexican ancestry make up more than 
92% of Respondent's total employees, 9 6% of its San Antonio employees, and 
97% of the people doing the work for ~~hich Petitioner applied". The district 
judge concluded that there was no discrimination on the basis of ancestry or 
ethnic background. Respondent had a policy of not employing aliens on account ------------- ---
of "security reasons", and accordingly Petitioner was not employed solely ·----because she was not a citizen. 
Reversing the district court, CA 5 unanimously held that Title VII does 
2. 
not apply to aliens. The term "national origin" was held to mean "exactly 
and ownly that". It concluded that the words "national origin" are clear 
and unambiguous; that it was unnecessary, therefore, to consider legislative 
history; but that the limited legislative history on this point "is completely 
consistent" with the ordinary and normal import of the words (Appendix 4-A). 
There is an EEOC regulation (Appendix 6-A) which appears to lay down 
a flat rule against "discrimination on the basis of citizenship". CA 5 construed 
this as applying only to "discrimination" on account of national origin, and 
refused to follow the regulation if it was intended to create a per se rule 
broadening the scope of the Act. 
Under the policy consistently followed by Respondent in this case, 
f no alien - English, Canadian or whatever country, color or race - would 
have been employed. j 
New Issue 
In its brief filed in this Court, Petitioner raises for the first time 
a new issue. She relies on § 1981 of the Civi:!__lligbts Act aU870 for a~ 
elaborate argument that it bans private employment discrimination based on 
-......._ - - --- --
alienage (See Petitioner's brief, 2 6-3 6). ·------. 
Petitioner's brief is ambivalent on this new issue. In stating the 
"question presented", Petitioner frames - as the only question presented -
whether there has been a violation of Title VII. But in her brief, Petitioner 
relies on § 1981 "as an alternative legal ground for reversing the court below", 
3. 
' . 
arguing that § 1981 applies to private employment discrimination, protects 
aliens , and that Title VII should be interpreted to protect those employment 
rights protected by §1981. If we do not agree that Title VII should be so 
int<erpreted, Petitioner nevertheless contends that § 1981 provides an 
alternative basis for relief. 
Question Presented 
Unless we wish to examine the new issue raised for the first time on 
this appeal, the sole question is that presented to and considered by the courts 
below, namely, whether the term "national origin" .in Title VII includes 
"citizenship". 
Discussion 
On the basis of the ordinary meaning of the term itself, and the 
summary analysis of CA 5, it is reasonably clear to me that the case was 
correctly decided below and should be affirmed. 
If, however, we are to consider Petitioner's §1981 argument, we 
have something of a new "ballgame". Although I have not analyzed either 
the history or the language of that Section with any degree of care - and 
certainly not to the point of feeling confident as to an answer - it may well 
be possible based on the words alone to reach the result desired by Petitioner. 
The Civil Rights Act is notoriously open-ended, susceptible of the same sort 
of interpretation as some of the more general provisions of the Constitution itself. 
4. 
If, as I tentatively believe, the language of §1981 is not free from 
ambiguity, the legislative history and its interpretation by the courts becomes 
important. I will not undertake in this memorandum to give even a summary 
of the contention of the parties with respect to this history. Suffice it to say 
that the two briefs are "poles apart". Indeed, it is reasonably clear that 
counsel for one of the parties at least has been disingenious in the analysis 
of the legislative history because the briefs are irreconcilably divergent. 
This is also true - at least - without my having read the cases - in the 
treatment by the respective briefs of the authorities. I am inclined to 
accept Respondent's presentation and interpretation of the legislative history. 
'". lIt seems more logical on its face and the conditions and purposes which 
produce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts 
of that era, I would doubt that there was any Congressional intent to proscribe 
any private discrimination in employment against aliens. Respondent's 
statements with respect to the cases cited by Petitioner, if accurate, dispose 
of all of Petitioner's case authorities except Guerra v. Manchester Terminal 
Corp., 350 F. Sup. 529. Respondent states flatly that "every case cited by 
Espinoza in support of that argument (private discrimination against aliens), 
beginning with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, involves racial 
discrimination" (Respondent's Brief, p. 22, 23). 
One final point: even if the Act of 1981 could be interpreted as applying 
to private discriminatory action against aliens (as distinguished from state 
' . 
5. 
discriminatory action), there is the further question whether Title VII -
dealing broadly and explicitly with employment discrimination - has not 
superseded or preempted the more general language of § 1981. Petitioner 
recognizes the merit of this point, as her brief (p. 36) acknowledges that 
i 
"her rights under (1981) may be to some extent dependent upon the interpretation 
given Title VII by this Court." Petitioner then states, in the same paragraph, 
that "the courts are divided as to the relative priority of that right (under 1981) 
and the Title VII right where the two overlap. " (brief, 37). 
* * * * * 
Tentative View 
As presently advised, I am inclined to affirm CA 5. It is to be hoped, 
however, that oral argument - and particularly advice from my law clerk {if 
he has the opportunity prior to oral argument) - will shed light on the 1981 issue, 
if we decide to consider it. 
LFP/gg 8-9-73 
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and ownly that". It concluded that the words "national origin" are clear 
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elaborate argument that it bans private employment discrimination based on 
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"question presented" , Petitioner frames - as the only question presented -
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aliens , and that Title VII should be interpreted to protect those employment 
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interpreted , Petitioner nevertheless contends that § 1981 provides an 
alternative basis for relief. 
Question Presented 
Unless we wish to examine the new issue raised for the first time on 
this appeal, the sole question is that presented to and considered by the courts 
below, namely, whether the term "national origin" jn Title VII includes 
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Discussion 
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treatment by the respective briefs of the authorities. I am inclined to 
accept Respondent's presentation and interpretation of the legislative history. 
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produce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Acts 
of that era, I would doubt that there was any Congressional intent to proscribe 
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statements with respect to the cases cited by Petitioner, if accurate, dispose 
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discriminatory action), there is the further question whether Title VII-
dealing broadly and explicitly with employment discrimination - has not 
superseded or preempted the more general language of § 1981. Petitioner 
recognizes the merit of this point, as her brief (p. 36) acknowledges that 
"her rights under (1981) may be to some extent dependent upon the interpretation 
given Title VII by this Court.'' Petitioner then states, in the same paragraph, 
''that "the courts are divided as to the relative priority of that right (under 1981) 
and the Title VII right where the two overlap." (brief, 37). 
* * * * * 
!l'ehy.itive View 
As presently advised, I am inclined to affirm CA 5. It i.s to be hoped, 
however, that oral argument -and particularly advice from my law clerk -{if 
he has the opportunity prior to oral argument) -will shed light on the 1981 issue, 
if we decide to consider it. 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: John Buckley 
Re: Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.Inc., No. 72-671 
I think that the CA 5 opinion should be affirmed. My 
reasons for reaching this result are precisely those articulated 
------does not encompass citizenship. The nclusion 
of aliens, but it would do violence to the English language --------- --to twist the meaning of "national origin" to inc lude aliens. 
------------------------------~ ~----------As to the 1981 issue, I do not think that the 
question is properly before this Court. Resp asserts that the 
issue is raised here for the first time, and thts appears to 
--- 1~QQsce~r~t~llto,n~-------------
be correct. !OntH)'\tk!l should, of course, be discussed during ~ 
oral argument, but I suspect that petr never briefed the f l 
issue when he was before the Fifth Circuit. If the merits 
are reached, I am inclined toward the view that section 1883 
does not cover the case at bar. I have not done extensive 
research on this issue because I think that it 
_.. is not properly before this Court. 
Please excuse the brev1·ty of th· 1s memo, but I do not 
think the case presents much difficulty. I would have recommended 
against granting cert in this case because there is no conflict 
in the circuits. 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
$>ttprl'llll' \C nmt (tf t l! .- J.lnih·~ .§t;ttrt.' 
~1;Hd/ilt~1hllt , :p. Qt. ':30pJ(.~{ 
October 29, 1973 
72-671, Espinoza v. Far:ah Mfg. Co. 
Dear Thurgood, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court in this case. 
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No. 72-671 Epinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., fuc. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring in the result. 
Although I concur in the result and much of the Court's opinion, 
I am not in accord with the unnecessary excursion into the validity and 
meaning of the guideline of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission which provides: 
(copy p. 6 of Marshall's opinion) 
Mter stating that there is no occasion in this case to "question the 
~~~ 
general validity of this guideline", the Court - a.ftsl' spsmdat ing as 
4~J~uL~ ~~ 
1\to varioos po~sibls situations i\ concluded: 
(copy p. 7 of Marshall's opinion) 
It seems to me that this conclusion even if it were relevant 
) 
to a decision of this case, cannot be supported. The Court's opinion 
·~~~~ is iffi 8:\fl\od until it commences to address the EEOC guideline. 
1\ 
TZu-=~~·~£~ •st~/C that "the plain language of the statute supports 
A 1\ 
the result reached by the Court of Appeals ~ '(  p 2 ) * 
*Section 703 of Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e -2( a)( 1) makes it "an unlawful 
employment practice . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . 
any individ.J. al ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex ,or national origin". 
,. .,. . ~ 
2. 
And, after reviewing the legislative history and the consistent action 
of Congress with respect to federal employment, the Court GOPPe&Uy 
concludes: 
"To interpret the term 1 national origin 1 to embrace 
citizenship requirements would require us to conclude 
that Congress itself has repeatedly flaunted its own 
declaration of policy. " Supra, p. 4. 
It is impossible for me to reconcile the language of § 703, 
as correctly interpreted by the Court, with the language of the EEOC 
guideline. The latter states categorically, as a fact, that "discrimination 
on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination on the basis 
of national origin. . . " With all respect, it seems to me that the 
language of the Court quoted above is irreconcilable with the guideline 
which the Court then goes on, a few pages later in its opinion,( supra p. ~ 
to conclude that the "guideline may be validly applied ilx to a wide 
range of situations. . . II 
I am inclined to think that the guideline, contradicting as it 
does the statute and being incompatible with established f ongressional 




is facially invalid. But we need not address this issue in the present 
case, it would have been quite sufficient for the Court to have said 
merely (as indeed it did at another place in the opinion) that "application 
of the guidelinej would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional 
intent 
:icd:B:Id not to reach the employment practice in question. "(supra, p 8.)* 
~~~~/~,~ 
72a <e:6t:'ii, .. &Q teJ?'G; ~~ 
7lc,; j" · i If! .-~ .... aJ 4aw ~-
*I agree with the Court ther may indeed be situations where an 
employer professes to deny e ployment on the 1Dx:isx> basis of 
citizenship when in fact there i an intent to discriminate on the 
basis of national origin. As the ourt correctly said, "a citizenship 
requirement might be but one pa of a wider scheme of unlawful 
national origin discrimination" (su ra, p. 6). But such unlawful 
conduct, determined in each case 1:J a factual scrutiny, would be a 
circumvention of the statute itself. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 u.s. 424, 431 (1971). 
lfp/ss 10/30/73 Draft No. 2 
No. 72-671 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
ht()s"f-
Although I concur in a the result and~ of the Court's opinion, 
1·" /or:!]~ ,.,+- U/1!/~CR..SJ'M,JJ 
I am not in(accord with 1 I If what is sai~ l!lftt\8HOBBIUilJ ii 888MB 
/f 
,~.: .• &~ 
t about the guideline f(. the Equal Employment ,portunity 
Commission. &tu- 2 q C f~ j ( ~D(/;. f Q.Jj./7 7 
The Court recognizes that the guideline! is inapplicable to this 
case, but states that it "may be validly applied to a wide range of 
situations .... "~ As I read today's opinion, ~ 
I 
didmu wi+L ~~ ~~~ w~e-by-case 
f 
d .e+.t VY'MYI a fi;M 
:i:lweeUgatiun of whether~ "discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin". I 
would~ agree, of course, that there may be situations where 
an employer professes to deny employment on the basis of citizenship 
when in fact there is an intent to discriminate on the basis of national 
s~~~ 
origin. As the Court correctly~' "a citizenship requirement might 
be but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national origin 
&+.e..J at (p., 
discrimination." ~ But such unlawful conduct, determined 
where appropriate by a factual scrutiny, 
. ( ;.J.sR/.f ) j_ 2. 
1 vu::Jlo..~ 
would {be a c.D e '"to cation of 
" 
the statut~.itseti. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 
~ \ 
(1971). Recourse to the guideline, even if valid, would be ~unnecessary. 
11 ~I t../"' .. ~~ Yr0 ~ j-t_.J--
Altlroagh unnecessat y to dee ide in this e~ the guideline is 
I 
\a..o. ~ l \ (.AA ~\~c. -6 
facially invalid~ c-onfliutit:fg with the language of § 703. The relevant 
language of the guideline is as follows: 
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship has 
the effect of discrimination on the basis of national 
origin, a lawfully immigrated alien/ who is domiciled 
or residing in this country may not be discriminated 
against on the basis of his citizenship. . . . " 29 
CFR § 1606. 1(d) (1972). 
The Court's opinion CQP.otly holds that "to interpret the 
~k~hn-y] 
A term 'national origin' to embrace citizenship requirements would 
.floo ~ 
require us to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly n~ea 
BA'k-.) o. t/. 
its own declaration of policy. " ~&upra 9 !'· ...,... -1'-
---------------~ 
It semns:=W m8 t~ fh~ guideline explicitly does exactly what 
rl(\o 
the Court said would "~unt" congressional policy: It "interpret[ s] 
• the term national origin to embrace" citizenship; and it states, 
without qualification, that where there is discrimination on the basis 
of qtizienship [as conceded in this case] this is the equivalent of 
3. 
LA.--' 
discrimination on the basis of national origin and it6 therefore invalid. 
1/ I do not see:tkR how the Court's interpretation of the statute~ wh::feh 
nss_m can be reconciled with its conclusion that the guideline "may 
J1, 
be validly applied to a wide range of situations". The guidline leaves 
/\ 
no room for investigation of the facts. It enunciates a per ~rule that 
that "discrimination on the basis of citizenship" is the same as 
"discrimination on the basis of national origin". This is precisely 
the oppositexwm of what the Court holds in this case, it is contrary to 
~ 
the legislative history of § 703 and to establish congressional policy 
A 
with respect to federal employmen) and also is incompatible with the 
previous position of the Commission itself. 
The effect of the Court's dictum [that the "guideline may be validly 
applied in a wide range of situations"], conflicting as I think it does 
~ 
w ith the Court'~ holding as to the meaning of the statute, can only 
lead to confusion and misunderstanding. 
No. 72-671 Espinozav. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I concur in the result and most of the Court's opinion, 
I am not in accord with what is said, in large part unnecessarily, about 
the guideline issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
See 29 CFR § 1606. l(d) (1972). 
The Commission's guideline provides, in pertinent part: 
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national 
origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who is domiciled 
or residing in this country may not be discriminated 
against on the basis of his citizenship .... " 29 
CFR § 1606.l(d) (1972). 
The Court recognizes that the guideline's basic premise --that 
discrimination on the basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination 
on the basis of national origin -- is unsupported by the facts of the present 
case. Nevertheless, the Court states that the guideline "may be validly 
applied to a wide range of situations." Ante, at 7 . This cone lusion 
apparently rests on the Court's construction of the guideline as requiring 
a case-by-case determination of whether "discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship has the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin." 
2. 
As I read the Commission's guideline, however, it leaves no room 
for factual inquiry. It enunciates a per se rule that "discrimination on the 
basis of citizenship" is equivalent to "discrimination on the basis of national 
origin" and therefore expressly proscribes discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship. As the Court correctly holds, "to interpret the [ statutoryl 
term 'national origin' to embrace citizenship requirements would require us 
to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own declaration 
of policy." Ante, at 4. Yet the guideline accomplishes exactly that result. 
It "interpret[ s] the term national origin to embrace citizenship" by 
~L<...- /.-1..-L_ -1~ ..cj c~· A-fl •. . J ?{,-v ;_,_ i2l d!.c.JL, t ~, "'A_kl)fl. 
automatically equating discrimination on the basis of national origin. This 
result is contrary to the Court's major holding, to the language and 
legislative history of § 703 of Title VII, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), to 
the established Congressional policy with respect to federal employment, 
and to the previous position of the Commission. In these circumstances, 
the guideline would appear to be invalid on its face. 
But even if the guideline were interpreted as requiring only a 
case-by-case determination of whether discrimination on the basis of 
citizenship had the effect of discrimination on the basis of national origin, 
. . .. 
3. 
it would be maBih ntly superfluous. There rna~~ of course J many 
situations in which an employer professes to deny employment on the 
basis of citizenship when in fact there is an intent to discriminate on the 
basis of national origin. As the Court notes, "a citizenship requirement 
might be but one part of a wider scheme of unlawful national origin 
discrimination." Ante, at 6. But such unlawful conduct, determined 
where appropriate by factual scrutiny, would itself be a violation of the 
statute. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) . 
.>I-. 
Recourse to the guidline, even if valid, would be wholly unnecessary. 
~ 
The Court's dictum --that the "guideline may be validly applied 
\\ 
to a wide range of situations -- appears to conflict with the Court's ~t 
holding as to the meaning of the statute and invites relitigation of the 
issue we face today. 
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"'\ r ~ Cecilia Espinoza and Rudolfo 
'\ ~ On Writ of Certiorari 
Espinoza, Petitioners, 1.. to the United States 
c/"" .. Jr'V v. Court of Appeals for 
, ~ ~ Farah Manufacturing Company. the Fifth Circuit. 
/ v"'" ~} • Inc. 
/' ~ ~ [November -, 1973] 
~ Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
This case involves interpretation of the phrase "na-
tional origin" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Petitioner Cecilia Espinoza is a lawfully admitted 
resident alien who was born in and remains a citizen 
of Mexico. She resides in San Antonio, Texas, with her 
husband, Rudolfo Espinoza, a United States citizen. In 
July, 1969, Mrs. Espinoza sought employment as a scam-
stress at the San Antonio division of respondent Farah 
Manufacturing Company. Her employment application 
was rejected on the basis of a long-standing company 
policy against the employment of aliens. After exhaust-
ing their administrative remedies with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission,1 petitioners commenced 
this suit in the District Court alleging that respondent had 
discriminated against Mrs. Espinoza because of her "na-
tional origin" in violation of § 703 of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2 (a)(1). The District Court granted petition-
ers' motion for summary judgment, holding that a 
refusal to hire because of lack of citizenship constitutes 
Section 706 (e), 42 U.S. C. § 2000c-5 (c). 
72-G71-0l'l:\II01\ 
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discrimination on the basis of "national origin." 343 F. 
Supp. 1205. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding 
that the statutory phrase "national origin" did not em-
brace citizenship. 462 F. 2d 1331. We granted the writ 
to resolve this question of statutory construction, --
U. S. -, and now affirm. 
Section 703 makes it "an unlawful employment prac-
tice . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire ... 
any individual ... because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Certainly the 
plain language of the statute supports the result reached 
by the Court of Appeals. The term "national origin" 
on its face refers to the country where a person was 
born. or, more broadly. the country from which his or 
her ancestors camc.2 
2 See, e. g .. Minne~tota State Art Agnin~t Disf' rimination, 1\rJNN. 
STAT. 363.01, Suhd. 6 (HJ71), defining "national origin" as "the phre 
of birth of an incliYiclunl or an~· of his linen! :tncrstor~." 
Sewral States hn1·r statutr~ m:tking; it illr.e::tl to diH·rimin:ttr on 
thr hn~i~ of nation:tl origin. :tnrl m:m~· of the'r ~tatutes !t:nr :tppar-
ently been interpreted bY the appropriatr state enforcement :1genry 
ns not barring; citizm~hip re(Juiremrnt,-. For Pxampl<'. th<' New 
York Human Rights T.aw provides that it. is :m nnl:twfnl diRrriminn.-
tory practice to rcJusr to hire an~· .indi,·iclunl becnn~c of his or her 
origin and ndditionnll~· provides that. it sh:tll be unbwful for :m 
employer to make m1~· pre-employment in(Juiry "whirh Pxprrsses 
directly or indirertl~·. nn~· limitation, sperifiration or di"crimin:1tion 
as to ... national origin .... " N. Y. ExECUTTI'E LAw § 29G 
(l\1r Kinney 1972). The N rw York Stnie Commis~ion Again~t Dis-
criminn,tion has rulrd t h:tt :111 (•tnplon·r ma~· lawfully n~l' n .ioh appli-
cant whether he or Rhe is n citizen of tilP United St:ttr~. Sec 3 
CCH EMPLOYli[ENT PnAC1'. Gmm.: ,I 26,051. at 8899. 
While th<'~C interpretntiom of stn.tP statutp~ do not control our 
construction of feclcr!ll law, we think them indie::tti\·e of a general 
understanding that tlw trrm "nn,tionnl origin" cloPs not. rrnhmce a 
requirement of Unitrcl Sta.te~ citizenship. 
7:2-G71-0l'l~IO~ 
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The statute's legislative history, though quite meager 
in this respect, fully supports this construction. The 
only direct definition given the phrase "national origin'' 
is the following remark made on the floor of the House 
of Representatives by Congressman Roosevelt, Chair-
man of the House Subconunittee \Yhich reported tlw 
bill: "It means the country from which you or your 
forebears come from. You may come from Poland , 
Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country." 
110 Cong. Rec. 2548-49 (1964). We also note that an 
carlier yersion of ~ 703 had referred to discrimination 
because of "race, color, religion , national origin , or an-
cestry." H. R. 715~. 88th Cong., 1st Scss .. ~ 804, Oct. 2, 
1963 (Comm. print) (emphasis acldrd). The deletion 
of the \\·ord "ancestry" from the final Ycrsion was not 
intended as a matrrial change, see H. R. Rep. Ko. 914r 
88th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1963) , at 87, suggesting that the 
terms "national origin" and "ancestry" were considered 
synonymous. 
There arc other compelling reasons to believe that 
Congress did not intend the term "national origin" to 
embrace citizenship requirements. Rince HH4, the Fed-
eral Government itself, through Civil Service Commis-
sion regulations, has engaged in what amounts to dis-
crimination against aliens by denying them the right to· 
rnter competitive examination for federal em11loyment. 
Executive Order No. 1997 (HH4); sec 5 U. S. C. § 3301; 
5 CFR. § 388.101 (1972). But it has never been sug-
gested that the citizenship requirement for federal em-
ployment constitutes discrimination because of national 
origin, even though since 1943, various executive orders 
have expressly prohibited discrimination on the basis 
of national origin in federal government employment. 
See. c. g., Exec. Order 9346, 8 Feel. Reg. 7183 ( 1943); 
Exec. Order 11478, 34 Feel. Reg. 12985 (1969). 
7:2-671-0PI~ION 
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Moreover, § 701 (b) of Tit. VII, in language closely 
parallelling § 703, makes it "the policy of the United 
States to insure equal employment opportunities for 
Federal employees without discrimination because of ... 
national origin .... " Civil Rights Act of 1964, P. L. 
88-352, § 701 (b), 78 Stat. 254, reenacted, P. L. 89-554, 
80 Stat. 523 (1966), 5 U. S. C. 7151. The legislative 
history of that section reveals no mention of any intent 
on Congress' part to reverse the long-standing practice 
of requiring federal employees to be United States cit-
izens. To the contrary, there is every indication that no 
such reversal was intended. Congress itself has on sev-
eral occasions since 1964 enacted statutes barring aliens 
from federal employment. The Treasury, Postal Serv-
ice, and General Appropriation Act of 1973, for example, 
provides that "no part of any appropriation contained in 
this or any other Act shall be used to pay compensation 
of any officer or employee of Government of the United 
States ... unless such person is a citizen of the United 
States." a P. L. 92-351, § 602, 86 Stat. 471 ( 1972). See 
also P. L. 91-144, § 502, 83 Stat. 336-337 ( 1970); P. L. 
91--439, § 502, 84 Stat. 902 ( 1970). 
To interpret the term "national origin" to embrace 
citizenship requirements would require us to conclude 
that Congress itself has repeatedly flouted its own 
declaration of policy. This Court cannot lightly find 
3 Petitioners argue that it is unreasonable to attribute an~· great 
significance to these provisions in determining Congressional intent 
because the barrier to employment of noncitizens has been tucked 
away in appropriations bills rather than expressed in a more affirma-
tive fashion. We disagree. Indeed, the fact that Congress has 
occasionally enacted exception~ to the gener11l barriN indicates to 
us that Congress was well aware of what it was doing. Sec, e. g., 
P. L. 92-204, § 703, 85 Stat. 726 (1971) (Department of Defense); 
P. L. 91-382, 84 Stat. 823 (1970) (Library of Congress). 
72-671-0PINION 
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such a breach of faith. See Bate Refrigerator Co. v_ 
Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 38 (1895). So far as federal 
employment is concerned, we think it plain that Con-
gress has assumed that the ban on national origin dis-
crimination in § 701 (b) did not effect the historical 
practice of requiring citizenship as a condition of em-
ployment. See First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 
U. S. 640, 658 ( 1924). And there is no reason to believe 
Congress intended the term "national origin" in § 703 
to have any broader scope. Cf. King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 
309, 330-331 (1968). 
Petitioners have suggested that the statutes and regu-
lations discriminating against noncitizens in federal em-
ployment are unconstitutional under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We need not address 
that question here/ for the issue presented in this case 
is not whether Congress has the power to discriminate 
against aliens in federal employment, but rather, whether 
Congress intended to prohibit such discrimination in 
private employment. Suffice it to say that we cannot 
conclude Congress would at once continue the practice 
of requiring citizenship as a condition of federal employ-
ment and, at the same time, prevent private employers-
from doing likewise. Interpreting § 703 as petitioners 
suggest would achieve the rather bizzare result of pre-
venting Farah from insisting on United States citizen-
ship as a condition of employment while the very agency 
charged with enforcement of Tit. VII would itself be 
required by Congress to place such a condition on its 
own personnel. 
4 We left this question undecided in Sugarman v. Dougall, -
U. S. -,- n. 12 (1973). Sec Jalil v. Ilampton, 148 U. S. App. 
D. C. 415, 460 F. 2d 923, ccrt. denied, 409 U. S. 887 (1972); MotiF 
Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527 (N. D. Cal. 1971). 
il-671-0PT:\IO:\ 
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The District Court drew primary support for its hold-
ing from an interpretative guideline issued by the Equal 
Employment oppo;:-tunity Commission, which provides: 
"Because discrimination on the basis of citizenship 
has the effect of discrimination on the basis of 
national origin, a lawfully immigrated alien who 
is domiciled or residing in this country may not be 
discriminated against on the basis of his citizC'n-
ship .... " 29 CFR § 1606.1 (d) (1972). 
Like the Court of Appeals. we have no occasion lwrc to 
question the general validity of this guideline inso-
far as it can be read as an expression of the Com-
mission's belief that there may be many situations 
where discrimination on the basis of citizenship would 
have the effect of discriminating on the basis of 
national origin. In some iustances, for example, a cit-
izenship requirement might be but one part of a \\·icl0r 
scheme of unlawful national origin discrimination. In 
other cases, an employer might usc a citiz0nship test as 
a pretext to disguise what is in fact national origin 
discrimination. C0rtainly Tit. VII prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of citizenship whenever it has tho 
purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of na-
tional origin. "The Act proscribes not only ov<'rt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
It is equally clear, however, that these principles lend 
no support to petitioners in this case. There is no inch-
cation in the record that Farah's policy against employ-
mont of aliens had the purpose or eff<'ct of discriminating 
against persons of Mexican national origin.r, It is con-
"There i;; no ~nggr.-;tion. for rx:Hnplr, that thr compnny rrfu~ed 
to hire aliens of l\lrxicnn or SpaniRIHprnking b~1ck~~:ronncl while 
hiring tho"e of othrr nationnl origin~. Rt•Rpondrnt'~ prr~ident 
1:2-611-01'1:\10:\ 
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ceded that Farah accepts employees of Mexican origin, 
provided the in eli vidual concerned has become an Ameri-
can citizen. Indeed, the District Court found that per-
sons of :Mexican ancestry make up more than 96o/o of 
the employees at the company's San Antonio division, 
aJHl 977c of those doing the \York for which Mrs. Espinoza 
applied. While statistics such as these do not auto-
matically shield an employer from a charge of unlawful 
discrimination, the plain fact of the matter is that Farah 
docs not discriminate against persons of Mexican national 
origin \\'ith respect to employment in the job Mrs. Espinoza 
sought. She was denied employment not because of the 
country of her origin, but because she had not yet 
achieved United States citizenship. In fact the record 
shows that the worker hired in place of Mrs. Espinoza 
was a citizen who was Spanish surnamed. 
The Commission's guideline may have significance for 
a wide range of situations, but not for a case such as 
this whore its very premise-that discrimination on the 
basis of citizenship has the effect of discrimination on 
the basis of national origin-is not borne out.6 It is 
info rnl<'d t hr EEOC'~ Tie~~:ional Dirrrtor im·r~t ip;n t ing the rh :up;c· 
tha t. onre in it;; hif'tor~· thr rompan~· had mndr a ~inp;le exrrption 
to its polir~' ap;ain~t hiring nlirns, but thr nat ionalitr of the indi-
Yi.dual conrernrd is not rrnaled in the rrcord. ·while the rompany 
asks job npplirnnt s whrtbrr they nrr United States C'itizens, it make.;; 
no inquiry as to their national origin. 
6 It is suggested that a refu~nl to hire an alien always cli;.;adv:m-
tages that. person ber:lll~e or the rount I'~' of his hirth. A person 
horn in thr United Statr~. the aq2;11mrnt ~~:or~. nutomnticallY obtain~ 
cit izcnship n t hi rth. whilr t ho~r bam rlscwhrre cnn arquire citizen-
~ hip only through a long and somct imrs diflicult proc·c~::;. See S 
U . S. C. §§ 1427 (u) , l.J.:30, 142:3 (1), and 142:3 (2). Thr anHwer to 
this nrgumcnt. is that it is not the cmployrr who places the burdens 
of na.turalizat ion on tho::;e horn outside the country, but Congress 
itself, through laws enactrd pur::;uant to its ronstitutional power 
7:2-671-0PI~IOK 
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also significant to note that the Commission itself once 
held a different view as to the meaning of the phrase 
"national origin." When first confronted with the ques-
tion, the Commission, through its General Counsel, said: 
"'National origin' refers to the country from which the 
individual or his forbears came ... , not to whether or 
not he is a United States citizen .... " EEOC General 
Counsel's Opinion Letter, 1 CCH Employment Practice 
Guide~ 1220.20 (1967). 7 The Commission's more recent 
interpretation of the statute in the guideline relied on 
by the District Court is no doubt entitled to great def-
erence, Griggs v. Duke Power Ca., supra, 401 U. S., 
at 434; Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 
545 ( 1970) (MARSHALL, J., concurring), but that def-
erence must have limits where, as here, application of 
the guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious 
congressional intent not to reach the employment prac-
tice in question. Courts need not defer to an adminis-
trative construction of a statute where there are "com-
pelling indications that it is wrong." Red Lion Broad-
"To establish an uniform Rule of N::~turalization." U. S. CoNST., 
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. 
Petitioners' reliance on Phillips v. Martin Ma1'ietta Co1'p., 400 U.S. 
542 (1971), is misplaced for similar rea~ons. In Phillips wr held it 
unbwful under § 703 to have "one hiring policy for womrn 
:md nnothrr fnr men .... " 400 U. S., at 544. Farah, hmn•vrr, 
does not have a different policy for the foreign born than for those 
born in the United States. It requires of all that they be citizrns 
of the United States. 
7 The Opinion Letter was addres~ed to the quest ion whether it 
was lawful to discriminatE' against nonrE'sident aliens in favor of 
citizens and resident alirns, and exprE'ssly reserved any decision 
"regarding discrimination in favor of United States citizens and 
against resident aliens." N eyerthele s, the definition of "national 
origin" set forth in the Letter is inconsistent with that suggestrd by 
petitioners here. 
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casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969); see 
also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 193 (1969); l'olks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschajt v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261. 272 
(1968). 
Finally, petitioners seek to draw support from the 
fact that Tit. VII protects all individuals from unlaw-· 
ful discrimination, whether or not a citizen of the United 
States. We agree that aliens are protected from dis-
crimination under the Act. That result may be derived 
not only from the use of the term "any individual" in 
§ 703, but also as a negative inference from the ex-
emption in § 702, which provides that Tit. VII "shall 
not apply to an employer with respect to the employment 
of aliens outside any State .... " 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-1. 
Title VII was clearly intended to apply with respect to 
the employment of aliens inside any State.8 
The question posed in the present case, however, is 
not whether aliens are protected from illegal discrimi-
nation under the Act, but what kinds of discrimination 
the Act makes illegal. Certainly it would be unlawful 
for an employer to discriminate against aliens because 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin-for ex-
ample, by hiring aliens of Anglo-Saxon background but 
refusing to hire those of Mexican or Spanish ancestry. 
Aliens are protected from illegal discrimination under-
the Act, but nothing in the Act makes it illegal to dis-
crimillatc on the basis of citizenship or alienage. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither the 
8 "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects all indi-
viduals, both citizens and noncitizens, domiciled or residing in the 
United States, against discrimination on the basis of race, color,. 
religion, sex, or national origin." 
29 CFR § 1606.1 (c) (1972). 
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language of the Act, nor its history, nor the specific 
facts of this case indicate that respondent has engaged 
in unlawful discrimination because of national origin.9 
Affirmed. 
9 Petitioners argue that respondent's policy of discriminating-
against aliens is prohibited by 42 U. S. C. § 1982 which pro\·ides: 
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every 
Stato and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property." This issue was neither raised before the courts below 
nor presented in the petition for a writ of certiorari. Accordingly 
we express no views thereon. 
~tqtrtmt Qfoud of tqt 'Jtlttittb ~httttt 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
November 1, 1973 
Re: No. 72-671 - Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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